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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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ponderance of capitalist states was both immaterial and alien to the Russian
dictator ... He was more interested in the disintegration of this world
than in its stabilisation, and if he showed any willingness to participate in
a discussion on world federation., it was exclusively as a^temporary measure
and in order to prevent the creation of any anti-Soviet league. After the
destruction of Germany and Japan as Powers had been achieved, there
would be no state on the Soviet's horizon capable of going to war against
them. Thus Russia's future potential enemy could only be Great Britain.
Roosevelt and Stalin were both considering in terms of world-wide
dimensions, therefore Stalin was able to exploit Roosevelt in order to
weight the scales against Churchill's plan for the stabilisation of one
continent-Europe. Thus in return for indefinite and unconfirmed
promises for Roosevelt's scheme of a world peace,, Stalin obtained concrete
and immediate advantages in the recognition by the Atlantic Powers to
Russia's special rights in those areas between the Baltic and Aegean seas.
Such, it is repeated, were the creeds and plain demands of the partners
at this conference, but what means did each have at his disposal to enforce
his will upon the opponent ? Despite her success at the end of that year3
Russia was in no enviable position. The recompense of her territories
could not be considered as the deciding factor in the struggle; the Red
Army had cracked the Eastern edge of Hitler's fortress, but not pierced
it. Stalin's immense preparations for war seemed as if they were to
prove inadequate. Under his leadership, the Soviet Union had made
every effort within its powers in this direction, but it was a country which
had exterminated the majority of its intellectual class, destroyed its
former agricultural system and discovered that the new one was still
inadequate; a country where the people were suffering from continual
under-nourishment and frequent famine. No country with such an
extremely small output in every domain of economical life could, even
within the space of three five-year plans, reach the dimensions of the
war effort achieved by Germany during the seven years of Hitler's regime.
Germany had used no more than half her strength when she began to
fight Russia, for at least half or even more of her war-machine was engaged
on the seas, holding and keeping the European stronghold along the
Mediterranean and Atlantic shores to Northern Norway. Thus the effort
of half Germany, i.e., forty million people, if not surpassing, then was at
any rate the equivalent to the effort of the one hundred and seventy millions
in Stalin's Russia.
From the outset the Soviet Union found itself unable to fight and smash
the enemy alone. Stalin's answer to Churchill's speech on June 22,19413
offering an alliance, had been c supplies * and the demand for a c second
front' . , . But for that amazing output of goods produced by Britain
(with her population of less than fifty millions) and the United States and